RELIABILISTS SHOULD STILL FEAR THE DEMON

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Abstract

In its most basic form, Simple Reliabilism states that: a belief is justified iff it is formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process. But so-called New Evil Demon (NED) cases have been given as counterexamples. A common response has been to complicate reliabilism from its simplest form to accommodate the basic reliabilist position, while at the same time granting the force of NED intuitions. But what if despite initial appearances, Simple Reliabilism, without qualification, is compatible with the NED intuition? What we can call the Dispositionalist Response to the New Evil Demon problem is fascinating because it contends just that: Simple Reliabilism is fully compatible with the NED intuition. It is claimed that all we need to do to recognize their compatibility is appreciate that reliability is a dispositional property. In this paper I shall critically evaluate the Dispositionalist proposal.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)193-202
Number of pages10
JournalLogos and Episteme
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021

Keywords

  • New Evil Demon Problem
  • epistemic justification
  • reliabilism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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