Phenomenology without representation

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I criticise a recent variety of argument for the representational theory of experience, which holds that the very idea of perceptual experience entails the representational view. I argue that the representational view is not simply obvious, nor is it contained in the mere idea of the world looking some way. I also clarify and re-present an argument against the representational view due to Charles Travis.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1209-1237
Number of pages29
JournalEuropean Journal of Philosophy
Volume23
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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