Holes Cannot Be Counted as Immaterial Objects

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that the theory that holes are immaterial objects faces an objection that has traditionally been thought to be the principal difficulty with its main rival, which construes holes as material parts of material objects. Consequently, one of the principal advantages of identifying holes with immaterial objects is illusory: its apparent ease of accounting for truths about number of holes. I argue that in spite of this we should not think of holes as material parts of material objects. This is because the theory that holes are properties does not face the same difficulties as either of these theories that construe holes as objects of some sort.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)841-852
Number of pages12
JournalErkenntnis
Volume80
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 1 2015
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • Logic

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