Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon

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7 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)89-107
Number of pages19
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume98
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 1 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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