I consider a new, non-disjunctive strategy for ‘relational’or ‘naïve realist’ theories to respond to arguments from ‘perfect’ (causally matching) hallucinations. The strategy, in a nutshell, is to treat such hypothetical cases as instances of perception rather than hallucination. After clarifying the form and dialectic of such arguments, I consider three objections to the strategy. I provide answers to the first two objections but concede that the third—based on the possibility of ‘chaotic’ (uncaused) perfect hallucinations — cannot obviously be dealt with by the proposed strategy. However, such ‘chaotic’ scenarios are also problematic for standard representational accounts of experience. Thus I conclude that perfect hallucinations pose no more of a threat to the relational theory than to its main representational rival.
|Number of pages||29|
|Journal||Journal of Consciousness Studies|
|Publication status||Published - Nov 1 2014|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
- Psychology (miscellaneous)
- Artificial Intelligence